Integrating agency and resource dependency theories: the moderating effect of board size on the relationship between dividends and firm value in Malaysia

Future Business Journal

Table 3 Main Result-Pooled OLS, Random Effect and Fixed Effect

Variables	Panel A: Pooled OLS	Panel B: Random Effect	Panel C: Fixed Effect
DPS	3.1194*** (0.2745)	2.3900*** (0.3113)	1.5506*** (0.3420)
Board size	0.0297*** (0.0078)	0.0497*** (0.0088)	0.0487*** (0.0096)
DPS*board size	0.1654*** (0.0166)	0.1312*** (0.0188)	0.1125*** (0.0205)
Log(size)	− 0.1836*** (0.0110)	− 0.3186*** (0.0172)	− 0.3819*** (0.0216)
TLTA	1.3941*** (0.0792)	1.2514*** (0.0912)	1.1400*** (0.1000)
Blockholder	0.0011 (0.0009)	0.0008 (0.0011)	− 0.0032** (0.0012)
Cash holding	1.5102*** (0.1113)	1.3723*** (0.1138)	1.3862*** (0.1205)
Constant	2.4878*** (0.3360)	4.1711*** (0.8500)	5.3156*** (0.2936)
Observations	5057
Industry dummy	Included	Included	Excluded
Year dummy	Included	Included	Excluded
Breusch–Pagan LM test	7404.57 (0)
Hausman test	105.78 (0)

This table presents the Pooled OLS, RE and FE for Eqs. (1). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. P values for the Breusch–Pagan LM test and Hausman test are reported in squared brackets
***,**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively