Skip to main content

Table 6 Robustness Tests (C) \({Skept}_{i{\text{jt}}}\): Going Concern

From: The differential impact of distracted auditors in managing portfolio of financially distressed audit clients on audit quality: the role of professional skepticism

Dependent variable

\({{\text{AQ}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

 

\(\mathrm{Model }(3)\)

\((4)\)

\((3)\)

(4)

Variable

Financially distressed audit clients

Non-financially distressed audit clients

Constant

0.005

(0.037)

0.015

(0.018)

0.070

(0.570)

0.152

(0.420)

Main variables

\({\text{Distracte}}{{\text{d}}\_{\text{Auditors}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

0.035*

(2.049)

0.034**

(2.985)

0.016*

(3.734)

0.010*

(3.673)

\({{\text{Skept}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

–

0.079

(0.480)

–

0.030

(0.988)

\({\text{Distracte}}{{\text{d}}\_{\text{Auditors}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}*{{\text{Skept}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

–

0.039**

(1.970)

–

0.037*

(2.490)

Control variables_A

\({{\text{BM}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

0.002

(0.031)

0.003

(0.011)

0.000

(0.071)

0.001

(0.075)

\({{\text{Client}}\_{\text{Size}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

0.015***

(1.330)

0.029*

(1.661)

0.003

(0.852)

0.011**

(1.797)

\({{\text{Loss}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

−0.002

(−0.911)

−0.002

(−0.929)

−0.000

(−0.161)

−0.001

(−0.071)

\({{\text{Sale}}\_{\text{Growth}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

0.002

(0.905)

0.003

(1.006)

0.001

(0.113)

0.001

(0.158)

\({{\text{PPE}}\_{\text{Growth}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

−0.000

(−0.193)

−0.001

(−0.375)

−0.000

(−0.108)

−0.001

(−0.209)

\({{\text{Lev}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

0.002

(0.355)

0.001

(1.053)

0.002**

(1.820)

0.002

(1.450)

\({{\text{Liq}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

0.001

(1.130)

0.000

(1.059)

0.000

(0.540)

0.000

(0.651)

\({{\text{ROA}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

−0.011

(−0.560)

−0.010

(−0.470)

−0.037

(−1.012)

−0.035

(−1.002)

\({{\text{OCF}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

0.005

(0.164)

0.002

(0.028)

0.014

(0.911)

0.007

(0.757)

\({{\text{M}}\&{\text{A}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

0.000

(0.329)

0.000

(0.157)

0.009**

(1.390)

0.009**

(1.033)

\({{\text{Z}}\_{\text{score}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

−0.001

(−0.759)

−0.000

(−0.889)

−0.001

(−0.389)

−0.000

(−0.411)

Control variables_B

\({{\text{Audit}}\_{\text{Size}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

−0.007

(−0.978)

−0.009

(−1.280)

−0.011

(−0.968)

−0.015

(−1.207)

\({{\text{No}}\_{\text{Clients}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

−0.001

(−0.632)

−0.000

(−0.750)

−0.001

(−0.410)

−0.000

(−0.601)

\({{\text{Busy}}\_{\text{Season}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

0.050

(1.562)

0.050***

(1.349)

0.034

(1.351)

0.034

(1.219)

\({{\text{Audit}}\_{\text{Tenure}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

−0.012

(−0.801)

−0.032**

(−1.633)

−0.000

(−0.201)

−0.000

(−0.506)

\({{\text{Audit}}\_{\text{Lag}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

−0.028

(−0.847)

−0.030

(−0.860)

−0.001

(−0.203)

−0.000

(−0.132)

\({{\text{Big}}\_4}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

−0.043

(−1.508)

−0.026

(−1.001)

−0.034

(−1.496)

−0.034

(−1.399)

N

742

adjusted \({{\text{R}}}^{2}\)

0.335

0.481

0.317

0.311

  1. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1