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Table 3 Empirical results

From: The differential impact of distracted auditors in managing portfolio of financially distressed audit clients on audit quality: the role of professional skepticism

Dependent variable

\({{\text{AQ}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

 

\(\mathrm{Model }(3)\)

\((4)\)

\((3)\)

(4)

Variable

Financially distressed audit clients

Non-financially distressed audit clients

Constant

0.003

(0.037)

0.012

(0.016)

0.008

(0.566)

0.008

(0.332)

Main variables

 \({\text{Distracte}}{{\text{d}}\_{\text{Auditors}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

0.035*

(2.047)

0.034**

(2.983)

0.016*

(3.733)

0.011*

(3.674)

 \({{\text{Skept}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

–

0.021

(0.891)

–

0.020

(0.482)

 \({\text{Distracte}}{{\text{d}}\_{\text{Auditors}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}*{{\text{Skept}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

–

0.031**

(1.778)

–

0.021*

(2.336)

Control variables_A

 \({{\text{BM}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

0.002

(0.031)

0.003

(0.011)

0.000

(0.071)

0.001

(0.075)

 \({{\text{Client}}\_{\text{Size}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

0.015***

(1.330)

0.029*

(1.661)

0.003

(0.852)

0.011**

(1.797)

 \({{\text{Loss}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

−0.007

(−0.915)

−0.008

(−0.934)

−0.000

(−0.164)

−0.001

(−0.078)

 \({{\text{Sale}}\_{\text{Growth}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

0.002

(0.905)

0.003

(1.006)

0.001

(0.113)

0.001

(0.158)

 \({{\text{PPE}}\_{\text{Growth}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

−0.000

(−0.193)

−0.001

(−0.375)

−0.000

(−0.108)

−0.001

(−0.209)

 \({{\text{Lev}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

0.002

(0.355)

0.001

(1.053)

0.002**

(1.820)

0.002

(1.450)

 \({{\text{Liq}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

0.001

(1.130)

0.000

(1.059)

0.000

(0.540)

0.000

(0.651)

 \({{\text{ROA}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

−0.011

(−0.560)

−0.010

(−0.470)

−0.037

(−1.012)

−0.035

(−1.002)

 \({{\text{OCF}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

0.005

(0.164)

0.002

(0.028)

0.014

(0.911)

0.007

(0.757)

 \({{\text{M}}\&{\text{A}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

0.001

(0.332)

0.000

(0.161)

0.010***

(1.410)

0.009**

(1.035)

 \({{\text{Z}}\_{\text{score}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

−0.001

(−0.759)

−0.000

(−0.889)

−0.001

(−0.389)

−0.000

(−0.411)

Control variables_B

 \({{\text{Audit}}\_{\text{Size}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

−0.007

(−0.978)

−0.009

(−1.280)

−0.011

(−0.968)

−0.015

(−1.207)

 \({{\text{No}}\_{\text{Clients}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

−0.001

(−0.632)

−0.000

(−0.750)

−0.001

(−0.410)

−0.000

(−0.601)

 \({{\text{Busy}}\_{\text{Season}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

0.053

(1.570)

0.058***

(1.354)

0.036

(1.361)

0.034

(1.222)

 \({{\text{Audit}}\_{\text{Tenure}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

−0.013

(−0.806)

−0.033**

(−1.648)

−0.002

(−0.205)

−0.004

(−0.507)

 \({{\text{Audit}}\_{\text{Lag}}}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

−0.028

(−0.847)

−0.030

(−0.860)

−0.001

(−0.203)

−0.000

(−0.132)

 \({{\text{Big}}\_4}_{{\text{ijt}}}\)

−0.045

(−1.515)

−0.027

(−1.002)

−0.035

(−1.498)

−0.034

(−1.405)

N

742

adjusted \({{\text{R}}}^{2}\)

0.785

0.383

0.409

0.475

  1. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1