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Table 6 Interaction effect of dividend policy and women in governance system on bank risk-taking: dynamic system GMM estimation

From: Dividend policy framework and bank risk-taking in Africa: do women inclusion in governance system offer new insight?

 

Interaction between women in governance and dividend payout decision

Interaction between women in governance and dividend yield

VARIABLES

Model 13

Model 14

Model 15

Model 16

Model 17

Model 18

Bank risk-takingt−1

0.2154***

0.2122***

0.0305*

0.0447**

0.0434**

0.0390**

(0.0616)

(0.0639)

(0.0169)

(0.0209)

(0.0206)

(0.0194)

Dividend payout decision

0.0509**

0.0515**

0.0517**

   

(0.0239)

(0.0235)

(0.0237)

   

Dividend yield

   

0.0147***

0.0836***

0.0390**

   

(0.00454)

(0.0203)

(0.0194)

Independent women on board

0.0835**

  

0.715

  

(0.0419)

  

(0.970)

  

Women in ministry

 

0.0174

  

0.0132

 
 

(0.0378)

  

(0.0460)

 

Women in parliament

  

0.00579

  

-0.0101

  

(0.0337)

  

(0.0400)

Dividend payout decision* Independent women on board

0.0556*

     

(0.0305)

     

Dividend payout decision* Women in ministry

 

− 0.00194*

    
 

(0.000999)

    

Dividend payout decision* Women in parliament

  

− 0.0024**

   
  

(0.00120)

   

Dividend yield* Independent women on board

   

0.291***

  
   

(0.0878)

  

Dividend yield*Women in ministry

    

− 0.0026**

 
    

(0.00128)

 

Dividend yield* Women in parliament

     

− 0.00109***

     

(0.000307)

Bank concentration

− 0.0577***

− 0.0214

− 0.0615***

− 0.0501***

− 0.0229

− 0.0551***

(0.0184)

(0.0193)

(0.0191)

(0.0184)

(0.0195)

(0.0192)

Overhead cost

− 1.575***

− 1.510***

− 1.546***

− 1.596***

− 1.505***

− 1.582***

(0.152)

(0.160)

(0.157)

(0.152)

(0.161)

(0.158)

Credit risk

− 0.169

− 0.180

− 0.179

− 0.297*

− 0.0860

− 0.305

(0.171)

(0.256)

(0.178)

(0.177)

(0.264)

(0.187)

Capital regulation

− 0.604***

0.0148

− 0.596***

− 0.670***

0.0805

− 0.648***

(0.163)

(0.262)

(0.171)

(0.164)

(0.261)

(0.172)

Inflation

− 0.0399

0.107

− 0.0420

− 0.0396

0.138

− 0.0405

(0.0573)

(0.119)

(0.0582)

(0.0569)

(0.118)

(0.0580)

Foreign bank entry

6.161***

3.537

5.933***

5.675***

− 3.527

5.746***

(1.916)

(2.467)

(2.004)

(1.920)

(2.475)

(2.004)

Real GDP per capita

− 1.391*

3.174**

− 1.448

− 1.401*

3.010**

− 1.472*

(0.835)

(1.459)

(0.879)

(0.828)

(1.457)

(0.877)

Institution

0.246

0.474

0.304

0.225

0.477

0.309

(0.388)

(0.406)

(0.409)

(0.386)

(0.409)

(0.409)

Constant

46.90***

− 0.711

47.20***

48.40***

− 1.146

49.70***

(7.702)

(13.77)

(7.998)

(7.701)

(13.82)

(8.104)

Time fixed effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Country fixed effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

224

308

311

328

327

311

Number of id

40

40

43

41

48

43

No. of instruments

20

16

16

16

16

16

AR1

− 3.72***

− 3.71***

− 3.73***

− 3.61***

− 3.62***

− 3.61***

AR(2)

1.063

1.048

− 1.657

1.040

1.043

1.071

P-value

0.288

0.294

0.306

0.299

0.549

0.483

Hansen's Test

8.512

9.067

12.12

6.212

13.64

14.07

P-value

0.284

0.431

0.335

0.184

0.195

0.222

F-test

1543.74

1406.33

22,159

11,793

1.520e + 06

1.035e + 06

P-value

0.000

0.000

0

0

0

0.00282

Net effect

0.07197***

0.014***

0.0051***

0.1249***

0.0334***

0.01783***

  1. Table 6 shows the interaction effects of women in governance system and dividend framework on risk-taking of banks. Dependent variable is the Z-score (equals the return on assets plus the capital asset ratio divided by the standard deviation of asset returns
  2. Standard errors in parentheses
  3. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1