| Interaction between women in governance and dividend payout decision | Interaction between women in governance and dividend yield | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
VARIABLES | Model 13 | Model 14 | Model 15 | Model 16 | Model 17 | Model 18 |
Bank risk-takingt−1 | 0.2154*** | 0.2122*** | 0.0305* | 0.0447** | 0.0434** | 0.0390** |
(0.0616) | (0.0639) | (0.0169) | (0.0209) | (0.0206) | (0.0194) | |
Dividend payout decision | 0.0509** | 0.0515** | 0.0517** | Â | Â | Â |
(0.0239) | (0.0235) | (0.0237) | Â | Â | Â | |
Dividend yield | Â | Â | Â | 0.0147*** | 0.0836*** | 0.0390** |
 |  |  | (0.00454) | (0.0203) | (0.0194) | |
Independent women on board | 0.0835** | Â | Â | 0.715 | Â | Â |
(0.0419) | Â | Â | (0.970) | Â | Â | |
Women in ministry | Â | 0.0174 | Â | Â | 0.0132 | Â |
 | (0.0378) |  |  | (0.0460) |  | |
Women in parliament | Â | Â | 0.00579 | Â | Â | -0.0101 |
 |  | (0.0337) |  |  | (0.0400) | |
Dividend payout decision* Independent women on board | 0.0556* | Â | Â | Â | Â | Â |
(0.0305) | Â | Â | Â | Â | Â | |
Dividend payout decision* Women in ministry |  | − 0.00194* |  |  |  |  |
 | (0.000999) |  |  |  |  | |
Dividend payout decision* Women in parliament |  |  | − 0.0024** |  |  |  |
 |  | (0.00120) |  |  |  | |
Dividend yield* Independent women on board | Â | Â | Â | 0.291*** | Â | Â |
 |  |  | (0.0878) |  |  | |
Dividend yield*Women in ministry |  |  |  |  | − 0.0026** |  |
 |  |  |  | (0.00128) |  | |
Dividend yield* Women in parliament |  |  |  |  |  | − 0.00109*** |
 |  |  |  |  | (0.000307) | |
Bank concentration | − 0.0577*** | − 0.0214 | − 0.0615*** | − 0.0501*** | − 0.0229 | − 0.0551*** |
(0.0184) | (0.0193) | (0.0191) | (0.0184) | (0.0195) | (0.0192) | |
Overhead cost | − 1.575*** | − 1.510*** | − 1.546*** | − 1.596*** | − 1.505*** | − 1.582*** |
(0.152) | (0.160) | (0.157) | (0.152) | (0.161) | (0.158) | |
Credit risk | − 0.169 | − 0.180 | − 0.179 | − 0.297* | − 0.0860 | − 0.305 |
(0.171) | (0.256) | (0.178) | (0.177) | (0.264) | (0.187) | |
Capital regulation | − 0.604*** | 0.0148 | − 0.596*** | − 0.670*** | 0.0805 | − 0.648*** |
(0.163) | (0.262) | (0.171) | (0.164) | (0.261) | (0.172) | |
Inflation | − 0.0399 | 0.107 | − 0.0420 | − 0.0396 | 0.138 | − 0.0405 |
(0.0573) | (0.119) | (0.0582) | (0.0569) | (0.118) | (0.0580) | |
Foreign bank entry | 6.161*** | 3.537 | 5.933*** | 5.675*** | − 3.527 | 5.746*** |
(1.916) | (2.467) | (2.004) | (1.920) | (2.475) | (2.004) | |
Real GDP per capita | − 1.391* | 3.174** | − 1.448 | − 1.401* | 3.010** | − 1.472* |
(0.835) | (1.459) | (0.879) | (0.828) | (1.457) | (0.877) | |
Institution | 0.246 | 0.474 | 0.304 | 0.225 | 0.477 | 0.309 |
(0.388) | (0.406) | (0.409) | (0.386) | (0.409) | (0.409) | |
Constant | 46.90*** | − 0.711 | 47.20*** | 48.40*** | − 1.146 | 49.70*** |
(7.702) | (13.77) | (7.998) | (7.701) | (13.82) | (8.104) | |
Time fixed effect | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Country fixed effect | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Observations | 224 | 308 | 311 | 328 | 327 | 311 |
Number of id | 40 | 40 | 43 | 41 | 48 | 43 |
No. of instruments | 20 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 |
AR1 | − 3.72*** | − 3.71*** | − 3.73*** | − 3.61*** | − 3.62*** | − 3.61*** |
AR(2) | 1.063 | 1.048 | − 1.657 | 1.040 | 1.043 | 1.071 |
P-value | 0.288 | 0.294 | 0.306 | 0.299 | 0.549 | 0.483 |
Hansen's Test | 8.512 | 9.067 | 12.12 | 6.212 | 13.64 | 14.07 |
P-value | 0.284 | 0.431 | 0.335 | 0.184 | 0.195 | 0.222 |
F-test | 1543.74 | 1406.33 | 22,159 | 11,793 | 1.520e + 06 | 1.035e + 06 |
P-value | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00282 |
Net effect | 0.07197*** | 0.014*** | 0.0051*** | 0.1249*** | 0.0334*** | 0.01783*** |