Table 5 Effect of dividend policy and women in governance system on bank risk-taking: dynamic system GMM estimation
Variables | Model 12 |
|---|---|
Bank risk-takingt−1 | 0.0284* |
(0.0128) | |
Dividend payout decision | 2.325** |
(1.146) | |
Dividend yield | 1.805** |
(0.843) | |
Independent women on board | 0.110*** |
(0.0393) | |
Women in ministry | − 0.00194* |
(0.000999) | |
Women in parliament | − 0.0025** |
(0.00120) | |
Bank concentration | − 0.0507*** |
(0.0184) | |
Overhead cost | − 1.551*** |
(0.153) | |
Credit risk | − 0.257 |
(0.178) | |
Capital regulation | − 0.618*** |
(0.164) | |
Inflation | − 0.0432 |
(0.0568) | |
Foreign bank entry | 5.687*** |
(1.917) | |
Real GDP per capita | 3.520** |
(1.475) | |
Institution | 0.204 |
(0.386) | |
Constant | 46.21*** |
(7.779) | |
Time fixed effect | Yes |
Country fixed effect | Yes |
Observations | 328 |
Number of id | 40 |
No. of instruments | 20 |
AR1 | − 3.748*** |
AR(2) | − 1.062 |
P-value | 0.288 |
Hansen's test | 7.942 |
P-value | 0.377 |
F-test | 129.7 |
P-value | 0.000 |
Net effect | n.a |