Table 4 Impact of women inclusion in governance system on bank risk-taking: dynamic system GMM estimation
Variables | Full sample | Banks that pay dividend | Banks that do not pay dividend |
|---|---|---|---|
Model 9 | Model 10 | Model 11 | |
Bank risk-takingt−1 | 0.761*** | 0.552** | 0.482** |
(0.267) | (0.172) | (0.189) | |
Independent women on board | 0.181*** | 0.0542** | 0.00874*** |
(0.0501) | (0.0260) | (0.00241) | |
Women in ministry | − 0.170*** | 0.181*** | − 0.718*** |
(0.0471) | (0.0444) | (0.239) | |
Women in parliament | − 0.0728* | 0.637*** | -0.0293*** |
(0.0400) | (0.126) | (0.0106) | |
Bank concentration | − 0.0257 | − 0.0596 | − 0.0395* |
(0.0201) | (0.0490) | (0.0228) | |
Overhead cost | − 1.469*** | − 2.561*** | − 1.451*** |
(0.167) | (0.458) | (0.176) | |
Credit risk | − 0.0867 | 0.850 | − 0.831** |
(0.271) | (0.634) | (0.404) | |
Capital regulation | 0.149 | 0.198 | − 0.0327 |
(0.277) | (0.812) | (0.317) | |
Inflation | 0.116 | − 0.516*** | 0.331** |
(0.119) | (0.183) | (0.153) | |
Foreign bank entry | − 3.417 | 26.23** | − 2.733 |
(2.604) | (10.22) | (2.842) | |
Real GDP per capita | 3.316** | 1.545 | 2.685 |
(1.531) | (2.409) | (2.334) | |
Institution | 0.549 | 1.247 | 0.482 |
(0.430) | (0.858) | (0.480) | |
Constant | − 3.361 | 26.67 | 5.820 |
(14.53) | (26.56) | (20.84) | |
Time fixed effect | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Country fixed effect | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Observations | 211 | 339 | 372 |
Number of id | 43 | 40 | 40 |
No. of instruments | 16 | 20 | 16 |
AR(1) | − 1.748 | − 1.784 | − 1.471 |
P-value | 0 | 0.0744 | 0 |
AR(2) | − 1.062 | 0.851 | − 0.663 |
P-value | 0.288 | 0.0412 | 0.473 |
Hansen's test | 8.512 | 9.067 | 12.12 |
P-value | 0.284 | 0.431 | 0.335 |
F-test | 129.7 | 13,757 | 33.61 |
P-value | 0.000 | 0.395 | 0.508 |