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Table 3 Effect of women inclusion in governance system on dividend policy framework

From: Dividend policy framework and bank risk-taking in Africa: do women inclusion in governance system offer new insight?

VARIABLES

Instrumental variable probit regression

Dependent variable: dividend policy decision

Two stage least square (2SLS)

Dependent variable: dividend yield

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

Dividend policy frameworkt−1

0.496***

0.0426***

0.0421***

0.0426***

0.113***

0.0559***

0.113***

0.104***

(0.0482)

(0.00544)

(0.00225)

(0.00205)

(0.0354)

(0.0181)

(0.0346)

(0.0329)

Dividend policy frameworkt−2

− 0.0959**

− 0.0835**

− 0.0875**

− 0.0988**

− 0.00423

− 0.00122***

− 0.00337

− 0.00249*

(0.0414)

(0.0419)

(0.0423)

(0.0327)

(0.00403)

(0.000453)

(0.00312)

(0.00139)

Dividend policy frameworkt-3

− 0.064**

− 0.0564**

− 0.0587**

− 0.0556**

− 0.0314

− 0.0365*

0.000216

− 0.0353*

(0.0258)

(0.0237)

(0.0239)

(0.0231)

(0.0194)

(0.0194)

(0.00710)

(0.0213)

Independent women on board

− 0.0911*

  

0.0942***

− 0.0805*

  

− 0.480**

(0.0488)

  

(0.0330)

(0.0477)

  

(0.215)

Women in ministry

 

0.179***

 

0.240***

 

0.00332

 

0.00415

 

(0.0404)

 

(0.0448)

 

(0.00254)

 

(0.00306)

Women in parliament

  

0.227***

0.161***

  

− 0.000160

− 0.000921

  

(0.0632)

(0.0396)

  

(0.00196)

(0.00275)

Bank concentration

0.00289**

0.00291**

0.00266**

0.00260*

0.00319***

0.00392***

0.00302**

0.00359**

(0.00121)

(0.00147)

(0.00126)

(0.00153)

(0.00118)

(0.00142)

(0.00122)

(0.00146)

Overhead cost

− 0.0200**

− 0.0120

− 0.0195*

− 0.00922

-0.0124

0.00956

-0.0115

0.0104

(0.0100)

(0.0122)

(0.0104)

(0.0127)

(0.00977)

(0.0123)

(0.0101)

(0.0126)

Credit risk

− 0.0616***

− 0.0573***

− 0.0599***

− 0.0523**

− 0.0545***

− 0.0447**

− 0.0531***

− 0.0394*

(0.0112)

(0.0195)

(0.0117)

(0.0207)

(0.0110)

(0.0204)

(0.0113)

(0.0210)

Capital regulation

− 0.0251**

− 0.0101

− 0.0224**

− 0.00560

− 0.0140

0.0129

− 0.0124

0.0177

(0.0108)

(0.0198)

(0.0112)

(0.0212)

(0.0104)

(0.0200)

(0.0107)

(0.0207)

Inflation

− 0.00118

− 0.0126

− 0.00104

− 0.0127

− 0.000661

− 0.0137

− 0.000372

− 0.0130

(0.00377)

(0.00889)

(0.00383)

(0.00907)

(0.00374)

(0.00852)

(0.00377)

(0.00865)

Foreign bank entry

0.358***

0.394**

0.326**

0.416**

0.309**

0.258

0.290**

0.278

(0.126)

(0.187)

(0.131)

(0.199)

(0.124)

(0.197)

(0.127)

(0.204)

Real GDP per capita

− 0.0460

0.145

− 0.0502

0.128

− 0.0166

0.185*

− 0.0217

0.170

(0.0549)

(0.111)

(0.0577)

(0.117)

(0.0519)

(0.0985)

(0.0540)

(0.103)

Constant

1.102**

− 0.618

1.085**

− 0.545

0.694

− 1.307

0.699

− 1.258

(0.507)

(1.049)

(0.525)

(1.108)

(0.478)

(0.935)

(0.491)

(0.976)

Time Fixed Effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Country Fixed Effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

327

224

307

211

351

237

333

226

     

R-square:

   

Pseudo R-squared

0.6698

0.6690

0.9043

0.8323

0.108

0.127

0.103

0.130

     

Chi2

   

Wald Chi-square

332.22***

331.82***

399.82***

367.99***

97.52***

88.25***

98.75***

90.12***

  1. Table 3 shows the effect of women in governance system on the likelihood of dividend payout using the instrumental variable (iv) probit estimation; as well as the effect of women in governance system on dividend yield (level of dividend payment) using the 2SLS. The dependent variable is the decision to pay dividend. The control variables are described under Tables 1 and 2 above
  2. Standard errors in parentheses
  3. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1