Does ownership structure reduce earnings manipulation practice of Egyptian listed firms? Evidence from a dynamic panel threshold model

Future Business Journal

Table 3 Correlation coefficient Matrix

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
(1) DAKZ	1.000
(2) MAG	− 0.043	1.000
(3) FAM	0.006	− 0.007	1.000
(4) GOV	0.073*	− 0.378*	− 0.227*	1.000
(5) INST	− 0.004	− 0.357*	− 0.184*	− 0.382*	1.000
(6) ROA	− 0.053	0.018	− 0.006	0.008	− 0.001	1.000
(7) ROE	− 0.008	0.004	0.014	0.029	− 0.035	0.864*	1.000
(8) LIQ	− 0.025	− 0.003	− 0.057	0.003	0.014	0.228*	0.046	1.000
(9) LEV	0.026	0.006	− 0.029	− 0.086*	0.104*	− 0.142*	− 0.062	− 0.371*	1.000
(10) GEAR	0.058	− 0.012	− 0.021	0.001	0.067	− 0.166*	− 0.042	− 0.364*	0.800*	1.000
(11) SIZE	0.046	− 0.019	0.015	0.068	− 0.078*	0.233*	0.328*	− 0.195*	0.051	0.155*	1.000
(12) TANG	0.001	0.018	− 0.025	− 0.045	0.076*	− 0.109*	− 0.178*	− 0.338*	0.115*	0.095*	0.118*	1.000
(13) OC	0.084*	− 0.004	0.035	0.058	− 0.064	0.081*	0.255*	− 0.288*	0.185*	0.336*	0.781*	0.010	1.000
(14) EFLEX	0.028	0.001	0.071*	− 0.007	− 0.055	− 0.049	0.111*	− 0.041	0.049	0.091*	− 0.153*	− 0.452*	0.254*	1.000

This table reports the correlations of variables for non-financial firms listed in Egyptian stock exchange between 2008 and 2017. Correlation is significant at the 5% level
***, **, and * represent significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively