Does ownership structure reduce earnings manipulation practice of Egyptian listed firms? Evidence from a dynamic panel threshold model

Future Business Journal

Table 2 Descriptive statistics

Variables	Obs	Min	Max	Mean	Std.Dev	Skewness	Kurtosis
Dependent variables
Kaznik_t−1	780	− 0.204	0.181	− 0.008	0.091	− 0.088	0.102
Main independent variables
Managerial ownership	780	0	72	16.522	23.238	1.213	0.033
Family ownership	780	0	23.6	3.756	7.073	1.793	1.93
Governmental ownership	780	0	93.4	21.386	30.790	1.27	0.104
Institutional ownership	780	0	74.5	19.232	25.430	1.015	− 0.49
Control variables
Return on assets	780	− 0.040	0.216	0.052	0.065	0.957	0.472
Return on equity	780	− 0.069	0.374	0.100	0.118	0.813	− 0.089
Liquidity	780	0.515	5.0461	1.834	1.188	1.375	1.141
Leverage	780	0.018	0.610	0.232	0.172	0.618	− 0.626
Gearings	780	0.019	2.0804	0.518	0.555	1.554	1.667
Size	780	4.677	6.9666	5.692	0.696	0.374	− 1.037
Tangibility	780	0.009	0.78	0.357	0.244	0.134	− 1.156
Operating cycle	780	4.097	6.8154	5.351	0.757	0.219	− 0.776
Earnings flexibility	780	0.080	0.873	0.400	0.224	0.557	− 0.596

The table reports summary statistics (number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, Skewness, and Kurtosis) for the variables used in the empirical analysis