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Table 8 Regression results of board of directors attributes and earnings management (Discretionary Accruals)

From: Board of directors and earnings manipulation: evidence from regulatory change

Dependent Variable

(1)

(2)

(3)

Pre-Period (2015 and 2016)

Post-Period (2018 and 2019)

Full-Period

MCDA

MCDA

MCDA

Independent Variables

Coefficient

t-value

Coefficient

t-value

Coefficient

t-value

BIND

−0.146

(−1.23)

−0.450**

(−1.65)

−0.224***

(−2.33)

BEXP

0.051

(0.54)

−0.454***

(−2.02)

−0.137**

(−1.78)

CEOD

−0.002

(−0.24)

0.000

(.)

0.007

(0.54)

BDIV

0.039

(0.40)

0.277

(0.99)

0.169***

(2.05)

FD

0.111

(0.86)

−0.170

(−0.47)

−0.116

(−1.20)

BMEET

0.008**

(1.81)

0.002

(0.23)

0.000

(0.06)

BSIZE

0.010

(0.75)

−0.033

(−0.79)

0.009

(0.75)

ACIND

−0.042

(−0.67)

0.246

(1.00)

0.133***

(2.20)

ACEXP

−0.071

(−1.09)

0.112

(0.94)

−0.003

(−0.06)

BIG4

−0.012

(−0.27)

0.005

(0.05)

0.023

(0.68)

ROA

0.002

(1.48)

−0.002

(−0.64)

−0.001

(−0.85)

LEVE

−0.165***

(−2.30)

0.004

(0.02)

0.002

(0.04)

FAGE

0.016***

(2.45)

−0.016

(−0.85)

0.011***

(2.88)

TANG

0.012

(0.19)

−0.058

(−0.33)

0.015

(0.30)

FSIZE

0.062**

(1.80)

0.089

(1.02)

0.047***

(2.34)

LOSS(D)

0.024

(1.54)

0.048

(1.16)

0.043***

(2.79)

CFO

−0.911***

(−21.88)

−0.001

(−1.63)

−0.002***

(−4.61)

SALES

0.046***

(2.58)

0.128***

(2.21)

0.031**

(1.73)

INV

−0.251***

(−2.22)

0.651***

(2.84)

0.553***

(6.84)

Constant

−1.162***

(−3.14)

0.055

(0.06)

−0.977***

(−4.89)

Observations

394

 

381

 

977

 

Groups(firms)

207

 

205

 

217

 

R2

0.778

 

0.170

 

0.188

 

F-Statistics

31.343***

 

1.801***

 

9.042***

 
  1. t statistics in parentheses, ** p < 0.10, *** p < 0.05