Impact of board of directors attributes on real-based earnings management: further evidence from Egypt

Future Business Journal

Table 3 Descriptive statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	SD	Skewness	Kurtosis
ABCFO	780	− 0.1161	0.3152	0.063246	0.109628	0.622	− 0.033
ABPROD	771	− 0.3129	0.9497	0.15093	0.3463521	0.889	− 0.085
ABDISX	780	− 0.0001	0.1245	0.046524	0.0356111	0.742	− 0.45
RM1	780	− 0.5193	0.9232	0.091336	0.3780786	0.535	− 0.286
RM2	780	− 0.3813	0.0752	− 0.112051	0.1188598	− 0.659	− 0.152
RM3	780	− 0.61	0.9132	0.041996	0.3932643	0.479	− 0.237
BRDSIZE	780	3	15	7.87	2.615	0.596	− 0.052
BRDIND	780	0	1	0.737874	0.1712428	− 0.937	0.609
CEO Duality	779	0	1	0.71	0.455	− 0.913	− 1.169
BRDMEET	780	1	18	9.59	4.077	0.184	− 1.149
ROA	780	− 0.0398	0.2163	0.051876	0.0650379	0.957	0.472
ROE	780	− 0.0688	0.374	0.100429	0.1185833	0.813	− 0.089
LIQU	780	0.5147	5.0461	1.833757	1.1885192	1.375	1.141
LEV	780	0.0182	0.6098	0.232505	0.1724446	0.618	− 0.626
GEAR	780	0.0195	2.0804	0.518018	0.5552779	1.554	1.667
AT	780	0.0089	0.78	0.356718	0.2437437	0.134	− 1.156
OC	780	4.0974	6.8154	5.351267	0.7572294	0.219	− 0.776
EMFLEX	780	0.0799	0.8734	0.400584	0.2238405	0.557	− 0.596
FIRM-Size	780	4.6774	6.9666	5.691671	0.6958374	0.374	− 1.037
Valid N (listwise)	770

This table presents the descriptive statistics for REM Models variables. The mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values are presented in the columns for the CG characteristics, and firm-level characteristics on accrual-based EM for firms in the Egyptian context from 2008 to 2017
BRDSIZE board size, BRDIND Board independence, CEO.DUL CEO duality, BRDMEET Board meetings, ROA Return on assets, LIQ Liquidity, LEV Leverage, Gear Gearing, Size; AT Asset Tangibility, OC Operating Cycle, EMFLEX EM-flexibility, FIRM-Size Firm size