Table 4 Corporate Governance-related studies with related variables in the HEC Recognized X-Category Journals
Serial No. | Study (Paper) Year | Dependent variable (s) | Independent variable (s) | Sample and data period | Key findings | Theory of the study |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Usman and Alam, [150] | Firm Value | Different Ownership Structure | The Sample consists of 135 non-financial companies with the period of 2004 to 2017 | Findings reveal that some proxies of Ownership Structure significantly influence firm value under interactive role of age | Agency Theory and Resources Dependency Theory |
2 | Shahid et al. [124] | Firm performance, capital structure | CG | 208 Indian and Pakistani firms for the period of 2006 to 2015 | According to the result CG significantly influences capital structure, | Agency Theory |
3 | Rasheed et al. [107] | Real EM | CG | 70 non-financial firms of PSX for the period of 2009 to 2014 has been used in this study | The board of directors Characteristics and AC independence has significant role in reducing EM | Agency Theory |
4 | Khan and Riaz, [79] | Liquidity | CG | Energy Sector for the period of 2005 to 2011 | The conclusion of the study documented that CG is a significant role in decisive the liquidity position of energy sector firms | Not specified |
5 | Ullah et al. [143] | RPTs of Business Group | Capital Markets | 207 non-financial firms for the period of 2006–2018 | The study reveals the conflict of interest hypothesis of the RPTs in listed firms | Agency Theory |
6 | Ali et al. [23] | Dividend Smoothing | Board Structure | All non-financial listed firms of PSX for the period of 2005–2015 | The findings of the study indicates that firms with large boards have a high level of dividend smoothing in Pakistani listed firms | Agency Theory & Information Asymmetry Theory |
7 | Shah et al. [119] | Financial reporting Quality (REM) | Board Structure | The Sample size of the study is 150 non-financial listed companies of PSX ranging from 2008 to 2017 | The findings of the study shows that among board structure board’s size and dual role of CEO enhances financial reporting quality | Agency Theory |
8 | Akbar et al. [20] | Firm performance | CG | The study include 195 PSX listed firms for the period of 2004–2014 | The results of this study document that the CG variables influences financial performance of firms in Pakistan | Agency Theory |
9 | Sheikh & Rafique, [131] | Working Capital | Board Attributes | The target sector was Textile Sector in Pakistan Stock Exchange. The data collection period was from 2008 to 2014 | Board size is unrelated to working capital ratio. Board composition is positively while CEO duality is negatively related to working capital ratio | Not mentioned |
10 | Khan & Saeed, [82] | Firm performance | CG | The sugar sector was selected for the sample for the period of 2000 to 2013 | The outcomes of the study shows that among CG variables Dual Position of CEO positively affecting performance as well as Board’s Size up-to certain extent | Not Clear |
11 | Ullah et al. [143] | Risk and Capital Structure | CG | The sample size include cement sector firms for the period of 2005–2014 | The result of the study shown a negative impact of CG on Capital Structure and risk | Not mentioned |
12 | Javid & Iqbal, [71] | Firm Performance | Ownership structure and CG | 60 non-financial firms for the period of 2003–2008 | Un clear | Un clear |
13 | Hassan et al. [54] | Cost of Equity | CG | The sample of the study consists of 230 non-financial firms for the period of 2003–2004 | The results showed that CG attributes such as Dual position of CEO, independence in the board and in ownership structure, institutional ownership have significant impact on cost of equity capital, in addition to this audit quality has also a significant relationship with cost of equity | Agency Theory |
14 | Khattak et al. [87] | Capital structure policy | Pyramidal Ownership(Business Groups) | The study sample consist of 250 different sector firms for the period of 2001–2014 | The results of analysis shows that pyramidal ownership firms are highly financed by external sources y as compared to non-pyramidal ownership | Not Clear |
15 | Ihsan et al. [60] | Earning Response Coefficient | Board Size | The study used 2008–2015 data period of 250 non-financial companies | The result of the study reveals that CG facet (large board size) plays a significant role to enhance the earning response coefficient | Not Clear |
16 | Hussain and Safdar, [57] | Tunneling | Family Business Group Affiliation | The sample of the study consists of 290 non-financial firms for the period of 2009–2013 | The study finds that there exists type II agency problem (tunneling) in Pakistani family dominated listed firms | Agency Theory (Type II) |
17 | Saeed & Saeed, [111] | Accounting Conservativism, moderating by Audit quality | CG | 100 listed firms of PSX for the period of 2009–2015 | This study finds that the level of accounting conservatism is positively associated with CG, and this relationship is weaken when there is higher audit quality and disclosure quality | Agency Theory |
18 | Ehsan et al. [42] | EM | CSR and CG | Systematic Literature Review | Not clear | Different theories of CG and Corporate Governance |
19 | Khalid & Kashif-Ur-Rehman, [75] | EM | Insider Trading | The sample of 354 firms with the data period of 2002–2017 were used in this study | This study finds that illegal insider trading has been detected in the PSX during all phases of bubble | Not Clear |
20 | Gul et al. [49] | Firm Value | CG | The sample of the study consists of 200 listed firms for the period of 2003 to 2014 | The findings of the study reveals that those firms whose have predominant ownership, have weak CG and lover firm value | Not Mentioned |
21 | Waseemullah and Hasan [152] | Firm Performance | Business Group Affiliation | Their study include 367 non-financial firms for the period of 1993–2012 | The findings of the study depicts that group affiliated firms are trading at underperform relative to stand- alone firms | Agency Theory |
22 | Ullah et al. [148] | Firm Performance | CG, Excess ownership & Ownership Structure | The study used 184 firms for the period of 2004–2012 | The outcomes of the study that ownership structure is a strong influential factor in affecting firm performance in Pakistan | Agency Theory |
23 | Latif et al. [90] | Earnings Quality | Institutional Ownership | The study utilized the data of 200 non-financial for the period of 2002–2014 | Results showed institutional ownership is positively related with earnings quality | Agency theory, stakeholder theory and stewardship theory |
24 | Khan & Nouman, [78] | Firm performance | Ownership Structure | This Study include the data of 177 non-financial firms for the period of ten years ranging from 2004–2013 | According to the results of the study ownership structure such as associated ownership, concentrated ownership, institutional ownership and block holding increases firm financial performance | Agency Theory |
25 | Latif et al. [90] | Firm Value with moderating effect of Earnings Quality | CG | The study utilize the data of 214 firms for the period of 2003 to 2014 | The results of the study show that the CG effectively improves the earnings quality and value of the firms | Positive Accounting Theory |
26 | Ullah and Kamal [146] | Cash Holdings | Corporate Board Structure | 150 Non-Financial Firms from 2001–2014 of KSX | The study support the “complementary effect hypothesis.” | Agency Theory |
27 | Alina Masood, [25] | Cash Holdings | CG | This study has utilized the data of 309 non- financial companies for the period of 2002–2010 | The outcomes of the analysis shows that monitoring of the shareholders stimulates the managers to not misuse the cash; moreover, the excess of cash holdings in the firms is mainly for dividend payment | Trade off Theory, Pecking Order Theory and free cash flow theory |
28 | Daud et al. [39] | External Finance | CG | The study analyze the data of 30 listed firms, and data collection period is from 2007 to 2011 | The findings of the study depict a positive relationship between CG practices and external financing | Not Mentioned |
29 | Ali & Nasir, [21] | Firm value | CG | The sample was the manufacturing sector for the period of 2007–2011 | Unclear | Unclear |
30 | Ullah and Shah [142] | Related party transactions | CG | The study include 160 non-financial firms for ranging from2006 to 2012 | The empirical results of the study document that board independence, blockholdings and institutional ownership play a vital role in reducing RPTS | Agency Theory |
31 | Iqbal et al. [65] | EM | Privatizations | The sample consists of State Own Enterprises for the period of 1991–2005 | These outcomes of the study says that managers of the firms slated for privatization were engaged in EM to inflate their firms ‘ financial worth to maximize the privatization proceeds | Not Clear |
32 | Yasser, [153] | Firm performance | CG | The sample of 134 PSX listed companies were selected for the period of 2003–2008 | The authors investigated that CG attributes affecting the performance of both listed companies either family or non- family controlled in PSX | Not mentioned |
33 | Ameer, [26] | Literature review paper | CG issues in Pakistan | Literature review paper | The poor governance in Pakistan is due to the ineffectiveness of independent directors or non-executives | Not Mentioned |
34 | Hussain & Shah, [59] | Systematic Risk and Socio-Political (moderating variable) | CG | The study has utilized 201 non-financial firms’ data for the period of 2003 to 2014 | The CG mechanism reduces the firm’s systematic risk and socio-political factor moderates the relationship between CG and systematic risk | Not Clear |
35 | Aurangzeb and Dilawer [30] | Dividend policy | EM | The study used the data of textile sector for the period of 1966–2008 | The findings of the study documented that EM along with control variables have negative relation with dividend payout policy | No Mentioned |
36 | Amin et al. [27] | Firm performance | Board Composition and CEO Duality | This study used the data 0f 40 listed companies for the period of 2006–2010 | The conclusions of this study shows that independent directors in Board has negative relationship with firm performance in Pakistan | No Mentioned |
37 | Latif and Abdullah [89] | EM | CG | The study has utilized the data of 120 non-financial companies for the period of 2003–2012 | The result of the study shows that AC independence is negatively associated with EM, while CEO duality and institutional shareholding is positively associated with EM | Agency Theory |
38 | Butt et al., (2009) | Cost of Equity | CG | The study has utilized the data of 114 non-financial companies, and data collection period is form 2003 to 2007 | The findings of this study reveals that board and audit committee independence has a positive relationship with cost of equity while managerial ownership and board size has negative relationship with cost of equity | Agency Theory |
39 | Kamran and Shah [73] | EM | CG | The data were from 2003 to 2010 of 372 firms of PSX | The main finding of the study is that family ownership increases EM as proxied by discretionary accruals | Agency theory |