Table 5 Regression results of the impact of political connections on the firm value using related party as a moderating variable
Model | Unstandardized coefficients | Standardized coefficients | t | Sig. | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
B | Std. error | Beta | ||||
1 | (Constant) | 3.345 | .680 | Â | 4.920 | .000 |
|  | Related_Political | − .590 | .183 | − .198 | − 3.231 | .001 |
| Â | CEO_gender | .916 | .461 | .108 | 1.988 | .048 |
|  | Board_size | − .016 | .012 | − .070 | − 1.341 | .181 |
|  | CEO_duality | − .258 | .118 | − .115 | − 2.184 | .030 |
| Â | Board_Exper | .260 | .124 | .114 | 2.100 | .037 |
|  | Firm_Size | − .310 | .103 | − .167 | − 3.017 | .003 |
| Â | Profitability | .621 | .359 | .092 | 1.730 | .085 |
| Â | Big4 | .320 | .128 | .137 | 2.500 | .013 |
|  | Leverage | − .693 | .313 | − .115 | − 2.214 | .028 |
| Â | Political_Conne | .621 | .138 | .275 | 4.509 | .000 |
R2 = 17.5% |  |  |  |  |  |  |