From: Fiscal dominance and exchange rate stability in Nigeria
Variables | Coefficient | T-statistic | Probability values |
---|---|---|---|
\(C\) | − 0.825 | − 1.615 | 0.109 |
\(D(ect( - 1))\) | − 0.035 | − 4.314 | 0.000 |
\(D({\Delta }e( - 1))\) | 2.241 | 33.947 | 0.000 |
\(D({\Delta }e( - 2))\) | − 1.971 | − 16.594 | 0.000 |
\(D({\Delta }e( - 3))\) | 0.677 | 10.264 | 0.000 |
\(D(m2\_growth)\) | 0.997 | 5.524 | 0.000 |
\(D(m2\_growth( - 1))\) | − 2.654 | − 6.523 | 0.000 |
\(D(m2\_growth( - 2))\) | − 2.560 | 5.963 | 0.000 |
\(D(m2\_growth( - 3))\) | − 0.917 | − 4.854 | 0.000 |
\(D(rgdpgr)\) | − 0.727 | − 2.085 | 0.040 |
\(D(rgdpgr( - 1))\) | 0.670 | 2.144 | 0.034 |
\(D({\Delta }budg\_def)\) | 0.010 | 3.910 | 0.000 |
\(D({\Delta }budg\_def( - 1))\) | − 0.021 | − 3.653 | 0.000 |
\(D({\Delta }budg\_def( - 2))\) | 0.018 | 3.107 | 0.002 |
\(D({\Delta }budg\_def( - 3))\) | − 0.004 | − 1.571 | 0.119 |
\(D({\Delta }public\_debt)\) | 1.884 | 23.543 | 0.000 |
\(D({\Delta }public\_debt( - 1))\) | − 4.270 | − 18.365 | 0.000 |
\(D({\Delta }public\_debt( - 2))\) | 3.778 | 12.476 | 0.000 |
\(D({\Delta }public\_debt( - 3))\) | − 1.287 | − 8.641 | 0.000 |
\(D(forein\_\text{int} )\) | − 3.460 | − 1.070 | 0.287 |
\(D(forein\_\text{int} ( - 1))\) | 10.516 | 1.401 | 0.164 |
\(D(forein\_\text{int} ( - 2))\) | − 10.891 | − 1.471 | 0.144 |
\(D(forein\_\text{int} ( - 3))\) | 5.546 | 1.807 | 0.074 |
\(D(\inf r)\) | 0.942 | 3.785 | 0.000 |
\(D(\inf r( - 1))\) | − 2.175 | − 4.000 | 0.000 |
\(D(\inf r( - 2))\) | 1.941 | 3.650 | 0.000 |
\(D(\inf r( - 3))\) | − 0.629 | − 2.713 | 0.008 |
\(D(finopen)\) | − 48.349 | 0.857 | 0.394 |
\(D(finopen( - 1))\) | − 7.017 | − 0.065 | 0.956 |
\(D(finopen( - 2))\) | 66.188 | 0.535 | 0.594 |
\(D(finopen( - 3))\) | − 69.357 | − 1.333 | 0.185 |
Adj. R2 | 0.995 | ||
F-stat | 2759 | ||
Prob. (F-stat) | 0.000 | ||
DW statistics | 1.82 |