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Table 6 Effect of governor’s gender and social capital on financial stability

From: Does competence of central bank governors influence financial stability?

  LLC NPL CAR CRISIS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Coefficient (t-statistic) Coefficient (t-statistic) Coefficient (t-statistic) Coefficient (t-statistic) Coefficient (t-statistic) Coefficient (t-statistic) Coefficient (t-statistic) Coefficient (t-statistic)
C − 11.719 (− 0.44) 8.255 (0.41) 17.833*** (2.97) 12.725*** (2.73) 5.699* (1.67) 8.747*** (3.32) 0.015 (0.03) 0.419 (1.42)
MALE 19.975** (2.02)   − 5.108** (− 2.36)   3.047** (2.48)   0.299 (1.45)  
EA*MALE − 26.348** (− 2.17)   4.392 (1.54)   − 2.643* (− 1.64)   − 0.142 (− 0.64)  
FEMALE   − 19.975 (− 2.02)   5.108** (2.36)   − 3.047*** (− 2.48)   − 0.299 (− 1.45)
EA*FEMALE   26.348*** (2.17)   − 4.391 (− 1.54)   2.643* (1.64)   0.142 (0.64)
PE 0.297 (0.03) 0.297 (0.03) − 0.906 (− 0.46) − 0.906 (− 0.46) 2.931** (2.59) 2.931** (2.59) 0.195 (1.35) 0.195 (1.35)
EE 1.648 (0.25) 1.648 (0.25) 1.318 (0.88) 1.318 (0.88) 1.771** (2.13) 1.771** (2.13) 0.189* (1.86) 0.189* (1.86)
EA 21.220* (1.96) 21.220* (1.96) − 3.831 (− 1.47) 0.561 (0.37) 2.374 (1.59) − 0.268 (− 0.323) − 0.037 (− 0.21) − 0.179 (− 1.57)
PD − 11.375 (− 1.54) − 11.375 (− 1.54) − 4.642*** (− 2.64) − 4.642*** (− 2.64) 2.084** (2.08) 2.084** (2.08) 0.163 (1.29) 0.163 (1.29)
AGE 1.035*** (3.27) 1.035*** (3.27) − 0.100 (− 1.41) − 0.100 (− 1.41) 0.071* (1.75) 0.071* (1.75) − 0.004 (− 0.89) − 0.004 (− 0.89)
GDPR 1.130* (1.96) 1.130* (1.96) 0.035 (0.24) 0.035 (0.24) − 0.034 (− 0.39) − 0.034 (− 0.39) − 0.011 (− 1.36) − 0.011 (− 1.36)
INF 0.099 (0.48) 0.099 (0.48) 0.012 (0.12) 0.012 (0.12) 0.038 (0.56) 0.038 (0.56) 0.0001 (0.03) 0.0001 (0.03)
INT − 0.291 (− 0.85) − 0.291 (− 0.85) 0.148 (1.55) 0.148 (1.55) − 0.112* (− 1.75) − 0.112* (− 1.75) 0.014*** (2.78) 0.014*** (2.78)
R2 85.40 86.24 65.37 65.95 66.47 66.47 48.65 48.65
Adjusted R2 81.97 83.00 57.13 57.85 58.25 58.25 36.13 36.13
F-statistic 24.89 26.67 7.94 8.14 8.08 8.08 3.89 3.89
Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 206 206 204 204 199 199 200 200
  1. The results in this table are estimated using fixed-effect regression. Country and period fixed effect were applied
  2. ***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5%, 10%