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Table 4 Effect of being a female governor on financial stability

From: Does competence of central bank governors influence financial stability?

 

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

LLC

NPL

CAR

CRISIS

RISK

Coefficient (t-statistic)

Coefficient (t-statistic)

Coefficient (t-statistic)

Coefficient (t-statistic)

Coefficient (t-statistic)

C

18.156 (0.91)

14.192** (2.57)

7.874*** (2.50)

0.205 (0.55)

16.244*** (3.88)

FEMALE

− 5.057 (− 0.71)

2.855* (1.79)

− 1.698* (− 1.86)

− 0.196 (− 1.54)

0.009 (0.01)

PE

− 1.927 (− 0.22)

− 0.735 (− 0.37)

2.858** (2.52)

0.171 (1.23)

− 1.373 (− 0.89)

EE

− 2.416 (− 0.38)

2.136 (1.52)

1.304* (1.66)

0.157* (1.78)

− 0.730 (− 0.67)

EA

1.335 (0.23)

− 0.407 (− 0.29)

0.277 (0.36)

− 0.137 (− 1.47)

1.029 (0.98)

PD

− 12.84* (− 1.72)

− 4.514** (− 2.56)

1.986** (1.98)

0.151 (1.22)

− 1.075 (− 0.78)

AGE

0.869*** (2.79)

− 0.075 (− 1.08)

0.055 (1.41)

− 0.006 (− 1.33)

− 0.029 (− 0.53)

GDPR

1.100* (1.89)

0.038 (0.25)

− 0.037 (− 0.42)

− 0.012 (− 1.41)

0.024 (0.22)

INF

0.184 (0.88)

− 0.023 (− 0.22)

0.060 (0.92)

0.001 (0.22)

− 0.058 (1.51)

INT

− 0.411 (− 1.20)

0.170* (1.79)

− 0.126** (− 1.99)

0.014*** (2.73)

− 0.058 (0.93)

R2

84.99

64.87

65.91

48.61

74.06

Adjusted R2

81.57

56.77

57.81

36.48

68.64

F-statistic

24.87

8.02

8.14

4.01

13.67

Fixed effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

206

204

199

200

221

  1. The results in this table are estimated using fixed-effect regression. Country and period fixed effect were applied
  2. ***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5%, 10%