Skip to main content

Table 3 Effect of being a male governor on financial stability

From: Does competence of central bank governors influence financial stability?

  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LLC NPL CAR CRISIS RISK
Coefficient (t-statistic) Coefficient (t-statistic) Coefficient (t-statistic) Coefficient (t-statistic) Coefficient (t-statistic)
C 13.098 (0.54) 14.192** (2.57) 7.874*** (2.50) 0.205 (0.55) 16.244*** (3.88)
MALE 5.057 (0.71) − 2.855* (− 1.79) 1.698* (1.86) 0.196 (1.54) 0.009 (0.01)
PE − 1.927 (− 0.22) − 0.735 (− 0.37) 2.858** (2.52) 0.171 (1.23) − 1.373 (− 0.89)
EE − 2.416 (− 0.38) 2.136 (1.52) 1.304* (1.66) 0.157* (1.78) − 0.730 (− 0.67)
EA 1.335 (0.23) − 0.407 (− 0.29) 0.277 (0.36) − 0.137 (− 1.47) 1.029 (0.98)
PD − 12.84* (− 1.72) − 4.514** (− 2.56) 1.986** (1.98) 0.151 (1.22) − 1.075 (− 0.78)
AGE 0.869*** (2.79) − 0.075 (− 1.08) 0.055 (1.41) − 0.006 (− 1.33) − 0.029 (− 0.53)
GDPR 1.100* (1.89) 0.038 (0.25) − 0.037 (− 0.42) − 0.012 (− 1.41) 0.024 (0.22)
INF 0.184 (0.88) − 0.023 (− 0.22) 0.060 (0.92) 0.001 (0.22) − 0.058 (1.51)
INT − 0.411 (− 1.20) 0.170* (1.79) − 0.126** (− 1.99) 0.014*** (2.73) − 0.058 (0.93)
R2 84.99 64.87 65.91 48.61 74.06
Adjusted R2 81.57 56.77 57.81 36.48 68.64
F-statistic 24.87 8.02 8.14 4.01 13.67
Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 206 204 199 200 221
  1. The results in this table are estimated using fixed-effect regression. Country and period fixed effect were applied
  2. ***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5%, 10%